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Outside the Police Station: Dealing with the Potential 
for Self-Incrimination in Juvenile Court 
Lourdes M. Rosado  
INTRODUCTION 
Youth in the justice system are at risk of self-incrimination, and 
the attendant consequence of prosecution, in ways that are distinct 
from those faced by adult criminal defendants. For example, the 
current trend to screen and assess court-involved youth (often before 
the youth are adjudicated delinquent) for mental health and substance 
abuse problems, using instruments that inquire about a wide range of 
offending behavior, raises the real possibility that youth will 
incriminate themselves. Under many states‘ transfer/waiver 
processes, juveniles facing prosecution as adults must submit to 
psychological or psychosocial evaluations in order to sustain their 
burden of showing that they are amenable to treatment in the juvenile 
court. Evaluators will typically question the youth about the charged 
offense(s) as well as their past criminal conduct.  
Youth also must submit to such evaluations when the issue of 
competency to stand trial is raised, a practice that will increase as 
more states pass juvenile-specific competency statutes. In keeping 
with the juvenile justice system‘s rehabilitative and treatment goals, 
youth who are adjudicated delinquent can be sent to treatment 
facilities where they undergo various types of counseling and 
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therapy. A key aspect of treatment, particularly in programs for 
sexual offenders, is admittance to the offending behavior—both that 
for which the youth was adjudicated as well as for other offenses of 
which the system may not be aware. 
Without explicit evidentiary prohibitions on the use of statements 
elicited in the scenarios above, and absent attentive lawyering, youth 
are at great risk of prosecution for statements procured for purposes 
that may on the surface look benign and even beneficial to the youth. 
(Who could argue, for example, that it would not be helpful for a 
youth to get treatment for a mental health disorder or substance abuse 
problem?) This Article offers both legislative and litigation strategies 
to attorneys representing youth who face potential self-incrimination 
when undergoing screening and assessment for mental health 
problems; when involved in transfer/waiver proceedings; those 
raising competency as an issue; or when participating in court-
ordered treatment.  
Part I briefly reviews the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Part II of this Article explains how that right is 
implicated when youth in the justice system are screened and 
assessed for behavioral health problems, and examines the recent and 
successful efforts in a half a dozen states to enact statutes that 
prohibit the admission into evidence of elicited statements. Part III 
examines the risk of self-incrimination in the transfer/waiver context 
and discusses recent successful challenges—in Nevada and 
Pennsylvania—to transfer/waiver processes that violated the right 
against self-incrimination. Part IV reviews statutes that set forth 
procedures and criteria for finding that a youth is incompetent to 
stand trial in order to determine whether these statutory schemes 
adequately protect youth from the adverse use of uch statements. 
Finally, Part V describes legal strategies for preventing the use of 
statements made in court-ordered treatment. 
I. JUVENILES‘ RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that ―[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
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against himself.‖1 The Sixth Amendment further protects those 
individuals charged with crimes, stating that ―[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defence [sic].‖2 Thus, the accused has 
the right to the advice of an attorney prior to waiving his/her privilege 
against self-incrimination. The U.S. Supreme Court extended these 
rights to youth in the seminal case of In re Gault.
3
 In Gault, the Court 
held that juveniles accused of criminal offenses must be afforded 
many of the same constitutional protections available to adult 
criminal defendants, including the right against self-incrimination as 
specified in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution.
4
 The Gault court also noted that ―the availability of the 
privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its 
protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or 
admission and the exposure which it invites.‖5 The Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted in any proceeding 
―in which the witness reasonably believes that the information 
sought, or discoverable as a result of his testimony, could be used in a 
subsequent state or federal criminal proceeding.‖6  
Under the Fifth Amendment, a statement is inadmissible if it was 
involuntary under the totality of the circumstances.
7
 Because the 
voluntariness of a confession or a statement is a question of fact, a 
court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the 
characteristics of the accused (such as age and mental capacity) as 
well as the details of the interrogation.
8
 The Supreme Court has long 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 2. Id. amend. VI. 
 3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 4. Id. at 55.  
 5. Gault, 387 U.S. at 49; see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (an 
individual has the privilege ―not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, 
civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future 
criminal proceedings‖). 
 6. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 672 (1998) (citing Kastigar v. United States, 
406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972)). 
 7. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285–86 (1991); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973). 
 8. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. Factors to be considered in determining the 
voluntariness of a defendant‘s confession are the age of the accused, his lack of education or his 
low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of 
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recognized that children, as compared to adults, are more easily 
manipulated by suggestion or coercion because of their unique 
developmental and situational vulnerabilities.
9
 For that reason, the 
Court has consistently held that extra care must be taken to ensure 
that statements by youth are not elicited by coercion or suggestion.
10
 
Further, a statement is inadmissible if an accused was not advised 
of his or her privilege against self-incrimination and/or did not make 
a valid waiver of his or her rights prior to custodial interrogation.
11
 In 
Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held that before being subjected to a 
custodial interrogation, the individual must be warned of his or her 
rights against self-incrimination and his or her right to counsel.
12
 
Absent these warnings, any statement obtained during a custodial 
interrogation or without the individual‘s valid waiver of these rights 
cannot be used in evidence if it would violate the individual‘s right 
against self-incrimination.
13
 A waiver is valid only if it is shown that 
the individual understood his rights and then knowingly and 
voluntarily waived them before answering questions.
14
 
Moreover, statements may not be introduced into evidence if they 
are deliberately elicited from an accused after the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches and the accused has not made a valid waiver 
of his or her right to counsel.
15
 The right to counsel attaches at the 
initiation of an adversarial judicial proceeding,
16
 which is usually at 
arraignment in the adult criminal system and when the petition is 
filed in the juvenile justice system. The Supreme Court has reasoned 
that to deprive the accused of counsel during the critical pre-trial 
period may be more damaging than denying him or her counsel at the 
 
detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical 
punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Id. (citations omitted). 
 9. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 45–46; see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53–55 
(1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–601 (1948). 
 10. See Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45–55 (1967); see also Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 53–55; Haley, 
332 U.S. at 599–601. 
 11. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 12. Id. at 444. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 444–45. 
 15. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469–71 (1981). 
 16. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 
264, 270 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964). 
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trial itself,
17
 and that counsel is particularly important in protecting 
youth given their inexperience and immaturity.
18
 
Finally, in addition to the protections found in the U.S. 
Constitution and established by Supreme Court precedent, almost 
every state constitution has a provision that affords the right against 
self-incrimination to individuals arrested or charged with offenses.
19
 
Several states have expressly extended these state constitutional 
protections to youth in the juvenile justice system through provisions 
in state juvenile codes or juvenile court procedural rules.
20
 
II. SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 
PROBLEMS 
A limited number of large-scale, empirical studies ―suggest that as 
many as 65%–75% of the youth involved with the juvenile justice 
system have one or more diagnosable psychiatric disorders,‖ 
including major depressive, anxiety, mood, and substance abuse 
disorders.
21
 One recent large scale study found that more than 60 
percent of youth assessed in three different juvenile justice settings—
community-based programs, detention centers, and residential 
facilities—met diagnostic criteria for three or more disorders and 
 
 17. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 159–60. 
 18. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54–55 (1962). 
 19. See LOURDES M. ROSADO & RIYA S. SHAH, JUVENILE LAW CTR., PROTECTING 
YOUTH FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION WHEN UNDERGOING SCREENING, ASSESSMENT AND 
TREATMENT WITHIN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM app. C (2007) [hereinafter ROSADO & 
SHAH]. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at C-6 (Alaska‘s juvenile provisions); id. at C-8 (Arizona‘s juvenile 
provisions).  
 21. ROSADO & SHAH, supra note 19, at 5–6 (citing JENNIE L. SHUFELT & JOSEPH J. 
COCOZZA, NAT‘L CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH & JUV. JUST., YOUTH WITH MENTAL HEALTH 
DISORDERS IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: RESULTS FROM A MULTI-STATE PREVALENCE 
STUDY 2 (2006); Linda A. Teplin, Karen M. Abram, Gary M. McClennan, Mina K. Dulcan & 
Amy A. Mericle, Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 1133–43 (2002); Gail A. Wasserman, Larkin S. McReynolds, Susan J. Ko, Laura 
M. Katz & Jennifer R. Carpenter, Gender Differences in Psychiatric Disorders at Juvenile 
Probation Intake, 95 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 131, 133–34 (2005); Gail A. Wasserman, Larkin 
S. McReynolds, Christopher P. Lucas, Prudence Fisher & Linda Santos, The Voice DISC-IV 
with Incarcerated Male Youth: Prevalence of Disorder, 41 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 314, 317 (2002)).  
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―60.8% of the youth with a mental health diagnosis also had a co-
occurring substance use disorder.‖22 
The high prevalence of youth with mental health and substance 
abuse disorders poses significant challenges to the juvenile justice 
system, which has become the last resort for youth in need of 
treatment but whose needs are not identified and effectively treated 
by other child-serving, community-based systems.
23
 Recent reports 
indicate that juvenile justice facilities simply do not have the capacity 
to identify all affected youth and provide them with appropriate 
services.
24
 Left untreated, youth suffering from mental health 
disorders pose a safety risk to themselves and to other youth in 
juvenile justice facilities. Moreover, court-involved youth with 
behavioral health disorders who are not identified and appropriately 
treated face serious obstacles to rehabilitation and ultimate discharge 
from the juvenile justice system.  
States and localities have launched various initiatives to address 
the needs of this population.
25
 Jurisdictions are implementing 
different models and conducting screening and assessment at one or 
more stages of the juvenile court process. For example, some states 
and municipalities administer behavioral health screening and 
assessment instruments at the intake stage (also known as the 
preliminary interview or inquiry, depending on the state) of juvenile 
court proceedings, before youth have been adjudicated delinquent.
26
 
Youth are also screened for mental health and substance use 
disorders, suicide risk factors and behaviors, and other emotional or 
behavioral problems upon admission to pre-trial detention and post-
disposition secure care facilities.
27
 Youth whose screening scores 
 
 22. Id. at 5–6.  
 23. Id. at 6–8 (citations omitted).  
 24. Id. at 7 (discussing U.S. H. R. COMM. ON GOV‘T REFORM—MINORITY STAFF SPEC. 
INVESTIGATIONS DIV., INCARCERATION OF YOUTH WHO ARE WAITING FOR COMMUNITY 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN THE U.S. 9–12 (July 2004); U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED 
PERSONS ACT: FISCAL YEAR 2004 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ 
documents/split_cripa04.pdf. 
 25. See ROSADO & SHAH, supra note 19, at 20. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 20–21. Indeed, numerous organizations and reports recommend—and 
accrediting organizations such as the American Correctional Association (ACA) and the 
National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) require—that all youth entering 
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raise red flags as to possible behavioral health needs are often 
referred for more comprehensive evaluations by clinicians.
28
 
But the very real potential arises for youth in these initiatives to 
make statements or to provide information that could later be used to 
adjudicate them delinquent or convict them in adult criminal court. 
Many screening and assessment instruments can elicit potentially 
self-incriminating information by asking youth questions concerning 
a variety of illegal activities including current and past drug use, 
history of violent or assaultive behaviors, sexual deviancy and sexual 
offenses, victimization, abuse, and weapons possession.
29
 Similarly, 
clinical interviews conducted as part of a more comprehensive 
evaluation can elicit self-incriminating information from youth by 
inquiring into the same types of behaviors.
30
 
 
juvenile detention or correctional facilities be screened for mental health and substance use 
disorders, suicide risk factors and behaviors, and other emotional or behavioral problems upon 
admission or very soon thereafter. They further advise that youth who score high on such 
screening instruments, or who demonstrate suicidal ideation/attempts or symptoms of mental 
health or substance abuse disorders, be fully evaluated by a mental health clinician. AM. ACAD. 
OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, PRACTICE PARAMETER FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND 
TREATMENT OF YOUTH IN JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 6–9 (2004), 
available at http://www.aacap.org/galleries/PracticeParameters/JuvDetCorrectionalFac.pdf; see 
also AM. CORR. ASS‘N, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE DETENTION FACILITIES 84 (3d ed. 1991); 
NAT‘L COMM‘N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, STANDARDS FOR SERV. IN JUV. DETENTION AND 
CONFINEMENT FACILITIES 60–62, 68–69 (2004); Am. Assoc. for Corr. Psychol., Standards for 
Psychology Services in Jails, Prisons, Correctional Facilities and Agencies, 27 CRIM. JUST. 
BEHAV., 433, 464–66 (Aug. 2000). 
 28. See ROSADO & SHAH, supra note 19, at 19–21. 
 29. Id. at 21–24 (excerpting questions from various screening and assessment instruments 
administered to juvenile justice youth including the Massachusetts Youth Screening 
Instrument–Second Version (MAYSI-2), GAIN-Short Screener (GAINS-SS), Child Behavior 
Checklist (CBCL), Youth Self-Report Form, Millon Adolescent Clinical Inventory (MACI), 
Comprehensive Adolescent Severity Index (CASI), Problem-Oriented Screening Instrument for 
Teenagers (POSIT) and Child and Adolescent Needs and Strengths–Juvenile Justice (CANS-
JJ)).  
 30. Id. at 21 (citing AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, supra note 27, 
at 10, 12); Am. Assoc. for Corr. Psychol., supra note 27, at 466; NAT‘L COMM. ON CORR. 
HEALTH CARE, supra note 27, at 68–69). Indeed, one commentator proposes that states enact a 
pre-adjudication privilege ―that is consistent with the rationale for other types of privileges, 
such as the psychotherapist-patient privilege and social worker-client privilege; retains the 
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court system; and protects children from their self-
incriminating statements.‖ John C. Lore III, Pretrial Self-Incrimination In Juvenile Court: Why 
A Comprehensive Pretrial Privilege is Needed to Protect Children and Enhance the Goal of 
Rehabilitation, 47 BRANDEIS L.J. 439, 441 (Spring 2009). 
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A number of states—Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Virginia—have statutory provisions and/or court rules that 
generally prohibit the admission into evidence of statements made 
during intakes, preliminary interviews, or preliminary inquiries to 
court or probation officers at an adjudicatory hearing and/or criminal 
trial on the issue of guilt.
31
 In addition, courts in at least two states—
California and New York—have held that statements made to 
probation and juvenile court officers at this stage are inadmissible in 
later proceedings.
32
 And four states—Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, 
 
 31. See generally ARIZ. R. EVID. R. 408 (2011) (effective until Jan. 1, 2012); ARIZ. R. 
EVID. R. 408 (2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2012) (evidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromised negotiations are not admissible; in practice, the statute protects statements made 
to intake and/or probation officers); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-321 (2011) (statements 
inadmissible in any proceeding); D.C. SUP. CT. JUV. R. 111 (2011) (statements shall not be used 
against the child in a delinquency or in need of supervision case prior to the disposition hearing 
or in a criminal proceeding prior to conviction); HAW. FAMILY CT. R. 123 (2011) (statements 
shall be inadmissible at the adjudication hearing and considered only in the disposition of an 
adjudicated petition); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-305 (2011) (statements made during 
probation adjustment are inadmissible in delinquency or criminal proceedings until after 
adjudication); IOWA CODE §§ 232.45(11)(a), 232.47(7)(b) (2011) (statements are inadmissible 
in case in chief unless court waives jurisdiction and statements were made voluntarily or after 
the right to remain silent was waived); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.060(1) (West 2011) 
(information received prior to filing of petition remains confidential); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. 
art. 841(D) (2011) (evaluations performed during the period of an informal adjustment 
agreement shall not be used against a child in any future court proceedings, adjudication 
hearing or later criminal trial); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 3204 (2011) (statements inadmissible 
at adjudicatory hearing); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-8A-10 (2011) (effective 
through June 30, 2013), 3-8A-12 (2011) (effective through June 30, 2013) (inadmissible at 
adjudicatory hearings and criminal trials); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-559 (2011) (no member of 
youth court staff, including personnel of detention and shelter facilities, may testify as to an 
admission or confession made to him); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.271 (2010) (statements shall not 
be used for any purpose whatsoever in any civil or criminal proceedings but may be admitted in 
juvenile proceedings); N.M. R. EVID. R. 11-509 (2011) (stating that a child has privilege to 
refuse to disclose and to prevent others from disclosing confidential communications made to 
probation officer or social worker during preliminary inquiry phase); N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B-
2408 (statements inadmissible prior to disposition); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-1010 (2010) 
(―statements of the juvenile contained in the department‘s files must not be furnished to the 
solicitor‘s office as part of the intake review procedure, and the solicitor‘s office must not be 
privy to these statements in connection with its intake review.‖); VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-261 
(2011) (―statements made by a child to the intake officer or probation officer during the intake 
process or during a mental health screening or assessment . . . prior to a hearing on the merits of 
the petition filed against the child, shall not be admissible at any stage of the proceedings.‖). 
 32. See In re Wayne H., 596 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1979) (concluding that use of a minor‘s 
statements in subsequent juvenile or criminal proceedings would frustrate the purpose of the 
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and Tennessee—prohibit the admission of statements made to intake 
officers and probation officers unless the juvenile has been advised of 
his or her rights against self-incrimination and has made a valid 
waiver of those rights.
33
 
A few states have similar protections for statements made by a 
child while in detention. Statutes in Illinois and Mississippi, for 
example, prohibit admission into evidence of statements made during 
detention.
34
 Alabama, Connecticut, Tennessee and Texas require that 
a child in detention be advised of his right against self-incrimination 
and that they make a valid waiver.
35
 And courts in Colorado and 
 
statute and therefore such statements are inadmissible as substantive evidence or for 
impeachment. However statements may be admitted for consideration on the issues of detention 
and fitness for juvenile treatment); People v. Humiston, 20 Cal. App. 4th 460, 475–76 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1993) (quoting Sheila O. v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 812, 816–17 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1981) (holding statements inadmissible at adjudication but admissible for impeachment when 
defendant testifies inconsistently with statements made to probation officer at intake); In re 
Randy G., 127 Misc.2d 1079, 1081 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (holding juvenile‘s statements made 
at an initial intake with a probation officer are not admissible at a fact-finding proceeding, but 
may be admitted at the dispositional hearing). 
 33. ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.040 (2011) (stating that the minor and the minor‘s parents or 
guardian, if present, must be advised that any statement may be used against the minor, and the 
minor has the rights to have a parent or guardian present at the interview and to remain silent); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-137(a) (2011) (statements are inadmissible in any proceeding 
concerning the alleged delinquency of the child making such admission, confession or 
statement unless made by such child in the presence of his parent or parents or guardian and 
after the parent or guardian and child have been advised of the child‘s right to retain counsel, or 
if unable to afford counsel, to have counsel appointed on the child‘s behalf; the child‘s right to 
refuse to make any statements; and that any statements he makes may be introduced into 
evidence against him); FLA. STAT. § 985.145(1)(e) (2011) (juvenile probation officer shall 
inquire at intake as to whether child understands rights against self-incrimination and to 
counsel); TENN. R. JUV. P. 5(c)(5) (―When a child is brought to the court or placed in detention, 
a youth services officer or other person designated by the juvenile court judge to serve as an 
intake officer for the juvenile court shall within a reasonable time inform the child . . . that the 
child is not required to say anything and anything child says may be used against him.‖). But 
see State v. Ledbetter, 818 A.2d 1, 4 (Conn. 2003) (confession made by juvenile is admissible 
in adult criminal court, although it would not be admissible in juvenile court proceedings); In re 
Ralph M., 559 A.2d 179, 186 (Conn. 1989) (admissible in transfer hearing). 
 34. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.5(b) (1987) (statement made during custodial 
interrogation or during detention shall be presumed inadmissible in criminal or juvenile 
proceeding); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-559(2)-(3) (1972) ((―[N]o member of youth court staff 
[including personnel of detention and shelter facilities] may testify as to an admission or 
confession made to him.‖). 
 35. ALA. CODE § 12-15-202(b) (1975) (upon being placed in custody, a child shall be 
notified of child‘s right against self-incrimination before any questioning); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 46b-137(a) (2011) (a statement is inadmissible in any proceeding concerning the alleged 
delinquency of the child making such admission, confession or statement unless made by such 
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Delaware have prohibited the admission of statements made while in 
detention.
36
 
The above general protections regarding statements made during 
intake or while in detention would similarly prohibit the admission 
into evidence statements made by youth via screening and assessment 
instruments, or during clinical evaluation interviews.  
Certain states have statutes and court rules specifically targeting 
and protecting statements elicited during screening, assessment, and 
evaluation for mental health and substance abuse issues. For 
example, the Texas Human Resources Code requires that juveniles 
who have been referred to the probation department be screened.
37
 
The statute further provides that ―[a]ny statement made by a child 
and any mental health data obtained from the child during the 
administration of the mental health screening instrument under this 
section is not admissible against the child at any other hearing.‖38 A 
Virginia statute similarly provides that pre-hearing statements made 
by a child to an intake or probation officer, as well as during a mental 
health screening or assessment conducted when the child is in 
detention, are not admissible at any stage of the proceeding.
39
  
In the last five years, at least four additional states have enacted 
provisions specifically protecting statements made during screening, 
assessment, and/or evaluation for mental health problems. In New 
Jersey, any statement made by a juvenile in the course of a suicide or 
 
child in the presence of his parent or parents or guardian and after the parent or guardian and 
child have been advised of: the child‘s right to retain counsel, or if unable to afford counsel, to 
have counsel appointed on the child‘s behalf; the child‘s right to refuse to make any statements; 
and that any statements he makes may be introduced into evidence against him); TENN. R. JUV. 
P. 7(a) (no child placed in detention shall be questioned ―concerning an alleged violation of law 
unless the child intelligently waives in writing the right to remain silent‖); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. §§ 51.095(d)(1), (a)(1)(C), (a)(5)(A) (1997) (in order for statements to be admissible, 
child in a detention facility or other place of confinement must make a knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary waiver of his rights). But see Ledbetter, 818 A.2d at 4 (admissible in criminal trial in 
Connecticut); In re Ralph M., 559 A.2d at 186 (admissible in transfer hearing in Connecticut). 
 36. People v. Robledo, 832 P.2d 249, 250 (Colo. 1992) (statement made to counselor 
while child was detained prior to charges being filed was suppressed because no Miranda 
warnings given); Holder v. State, 692 A.2d 882, 887–88 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (statements 
made to counselor at juvenile detention facility only admissible to impeach absent evidence that 
statements were made voluntarily). 
 37. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 221.003(a) (West 2011). 
 38. Id. § 221.003(c). 
 39. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-261 (2003). 
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mental health screening cannot be provided to the court, prosecutor 
or law enforcement without the juvenile‘s consent.40 Nor, may the 
statement be used in any investigation or delinquency or criminal 
proceeding currently pending or subsequently initiated.
41
 In 2007, 
Indiana passed an even more expansive law. Indiana statute provides 
that, except for statements directly related to a homicide, any 
statement communicated to an evaluator during court-ordered or 
voluntary mental health screening, assessment, evaluation or 
treatment may not be admitted into evidence on the issue of whether 
the child committed a delinquent or criminal act.
42
 The Indiana State 
Bar Association‘s Civil Rights of Children Committee, with 
cooperation from an advisory board that established mental health 
screening, assessment and treatment in Indiana‘s juvenile detention 
centers, successfully spearheaded the passage of this law.
43
 As one 
attorney involved in the Indiana effort noted, ―This law and . . . 
policies regarding confidentiality and disclosure are important to 
achieving cooperation among juvenile justice officials so that 
appropriate services may be obtained for youths who need them 
while in detention.‖44 
Similarly, Pennsylvania amended its Juvenile Act in 2008 to 
protect statements made in the course of screening and assessment for 
various behavioral health concerns.
45
 The effort to pass the new law 
was organized by a state working group of the Models for Change, a 
juvenile justice reform initiative funded by the John D. and Catherine 
T. MacArthur Foundation.
46
 The working group‘s charge was to 
 
 40. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-60.2 (West 2007). The New Jersey law was passed in 2007 
and became effective in 2008.  
 41. Id. 
 42. IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 31-32-2-2.5, 31-37-8-4.5 (West 2008). The statements, however, 
are admissible in a probation revocation proceeding or to modify a dispositional order. Id. For 
purposes of these provisions, an evaluator is any person responsible for providing mental health 
screening, evaluation or treatment to a child in connection with a juvenile proceeding. IND. 
CODE. ANN. § 31-9-2-43.8 (West 2008). 
 43. JauNae M. Hanger, Screening, Assessment and Treatment: Indiana Addresses Mental 
Health in Juvenile Detention Centers, 70 CORRECTIONS TODAY 36, 37–38 (Feb. 2008). 
 44. Id. at 38. 
 45. Mental Health/Juvenile Justice Collaboration, Work Highlights, MODELS FOR 
CHANGE, http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/States-for-change/Pennsylvania/Work-high 
lights0.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2012). 
 46. See Models for Change: Issues for Change Systems Reform in Juvenile Justice, Issues 
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overcome barriers in order to effectively identify and treat those 
youth with behavioral health disorders who come into contact with 
the justice system.
47
 One such barrier was a gap in Pennsylvania laws 
such that youth were not adequately protected from potential self-
incrimination in the screening and assessment portions of their 
juvenile court cases.
48
 The group argued that absent such protections, 
defense counsel, in accordance with their professional and ethical 
duties, would reasonably advise their youth clients to not participate 
in screens and assessments because of the consequent risk of self 
incrimination. Moreover, clinicians were obligated, under their 
professional codes of conduct, to advise the youth they assess as to 
how the information the youth reveals can be used in legal 
proceedings. Such warnings, however, would inhibit youth from fully 
disclosing relevant information to mental health professionals, thus 
undermining the effectiveness of diagnostic and therapeutic 
interventions.
49
  
Consequently, the working group drafted proposed legislation that 
was endorsed by all the major juvenile justice stakeholders, including 
juvenile court judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation 
officers.
50
 The enacted Pennsylvania statute specifically provides as 
follows: 
(c) Statements and information obtained during screening or 
assessment. 
(1) No statements, admissions or confessions made by or 
incriminating information obtained from a child in the course 
of a screening or assessment that is undertaken in conjunction 
with any proceedings under this chapter, including, but not 
limited to, that which is court ordered, shall be admitted into 
evidence against the child on the issue of whether the child 
 
for Change, MODELS FOR CHANGE http://www.modelsforchange.net/index.html (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2011).  
 47. See Mental Health/Juvenile Justice Work Group of the Models for Change Initiative, 
Eliminating Barriers to Rehabilitation: An Overview of Senate Bill 1269 Amending 
Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act to Protect Youth Against Self-Incrimination in Behavioral 
Screening, Assessment and Evaluation (Updated Sept. 16, 2008) (on file with author). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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committed a delinquent act under this chapter or on the issue 
of guilt in any criminal proceeding.  
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) are in addition to and do 
not override any existing statutory and constitutional 
prohibition on the admission into evidence in delinquency and 
criminal proceedings of information obtained during screening, 
assessment or treatment.
51
  
Finally, Illinois, also as part of that state‘s efforts under the Models 
for Change initiative, amended its Juvenile Act in 2010 to provide: 
A statement, admission, confession, or incriminating 
information made by or obtained from a minor related to the 
instant offense, as part of any behavioral health screening, 
assessment, evaluation, or treatment, whether or not court-
ordered, shall not be admissible as evidence against the minor 
on the issue of guilt only in the instant juvenile court 
proceeding.
52
 
But despite this growing trend, a survey showed that there are still a 
number of states—specifically, Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, 
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—that lack 
explicit protections in statutory or court rules and case precedents 
specifying that statements made during screening or assessment at the 
intake stage/preliminary interview are inadmissible for behavioral 
 
 51. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6338(c) (2011). Screening is defined as a ―process, regardless 
of whether it includes the administration of a formal instrument, that is designed to identify a 
child who is at increased risk of having mental health, substance abuse or co-occurring mental 
health and substance abuse disorders that warrant immediate attention, intervention or more 
comprehensive assessment.‖ 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (2011). Assessment is defined as ―[a]n 
individualized examination of a child to determine the child‘s psychosocial needs and problems, 
including the type and extent of any mental health, substance abuse or co-occurring mental 
health and substance abuse disorders and recommendations for treatment. The term includes, 
but is not limited to, a drug and alcohol, psychological and psychiatric evaluation, records 
review, clinical interview and the administration of a formal test and instrument.‖ Id. § 6302; 
see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(b.2) (2011). The information, however, is admissible at 
disposition. Id. § 6341(d)(1)(ii). 
 52. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.5(h) (2011). 
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health disorders on the issue of guilt. To the extent that screening and 
assessment projects are already under way in these jurisdictions, and 
in the absence of such protections, defense attorneys can advise their 
clients not to participate in the screening and assessment and/or not to 
answer certain questions that would reveal incriminating information.  
But there are drawbacks to this approach. First, as described 
above, screening and assessment often takes place pre-adjudication 
and prior to the appointment of counsel; in these instances, it is not 
feasible for counsel to advise his/her client in advance. Second, pre-
trial detention centers need to screen youth for mental health 
symptoms and suicidal thoughts and substance use so that personnel 
can develop plans to keep the youth safe and avoid a deterioration of 
his/her condition while in temporary detention. Third, this tactic 
forecloses the opportunity to, early on, identify the youth‘s 
behavioral health needs and such information can be used, for 
example, to divert the youth away from further formal court 
processing and instead into appropriate community-based treatment.  
An alternative approach is for defense attorneys to advocate for 
the legislature or for court rules that strictly limit the potential uses of 
information gathered during these processes because such provisions 
are necessary to protect youth‘s rights against self-incrimination. 
They can borrow statutory language from the jurisdictions described 
supra and can also draw on those successful efforts to gain support 
for passage of the measures as models for their own efforts. Key to 
such an endeavor is to build a diverse coalition of juvenile justice 
stakeholders who are committed to early identification and treatment 
of youth with behavioral health disorders and who understand why 
due process rights cannot be sacrificed in the process.  
This approach requires the defense attorney to take a 
policymaking role to initiate systemic reform. But what can the 
defense attorney do on an individual case level, when the government 
seeks to use statements made during pre-adjudicatory screening and 
assessment to prove the youth‘s guilt at trial? One possibility is to 
argue that the admission of these statements as evidence on the issue 
of guilt would frustrate the purpose for conducting initial intake 
interviews as set forth in the state‘s juvenile act. This reasoning was 
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adopted by the California Supreme Court in Fare v. Wayne.
53
 There, 
the Supreme Court of California noted:  
The primary purpose of the section 628 interview, as the 
statutes make clear, is not to elicit evidence of guilt—the 
function of police questioning—but to assist the probation 
officer in deciding at the outset of the case whether the minor 
need be further detained pending a court hearing. This 
approach thereby serves a paramount concern of the Juvenile 
Court Law—that a minor be treated in the least restrictive 
means feasible under the circumstances.
54
 
The court reasoned that the youth‘s candor in the interview would 
assist the probation officer in discharging his duty to find the least 
restrictive pre-trial setting for the youth, but that it would be unfair to 
make the minor choose between not being open (and risk being held 
pre-trial) or freely divulging information (and risk having the 
statements used against him at trial).
55
 The court went on to hold that 
statements made to the intake officer ―are not admissible as 
substantive evidence, or for impeachment, in any subsequent 
proceeding to determine criminal guilt.‖56 To the extent that 
screening and assessment is incorporated into the intake interview 
process, attorneys can similarly argue that the admission of 
statements at later proceedings would frustrate the purposes of 
screening for behavioral health problems and would be 
fundamentally unfair to the youth. 
Depending on the individual circumstances, defense counsel may 
also be able to make traditional suppression arguments that the 
statements were involuntary and a result of state coercion, and that a 
youth in custody was not properly Mirandized and did not make a 
valid waiver. Such arguments are discussed in more detail in Parts III 
and IV.   
 
 53. 596 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1979). 
 54. Id. at 4–5 (citations omitted). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. at 5. The court further held that the statements may be admitted and considered in 
hearings on the issues of detention and fitness for juvenile treatment. Id. 
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III. EVALUATIONS IN THE TRANSFER/WAIVER CONTEXT 
Courts order forensic evaluations for a variety of purposes—
including to aid the court in determining whether a youth should be 
tried in juvenile versus adult court, or to decide whether the youth is 
competent to stand trial—prior to an adjudication or conviction. 
These court-ordered evaluations can elicit information about 
offending behavior from youth. Guidelines for forensic assessment 
direct the evaluator to collect information by administering one or 
more formal instruments and interviewing the accused youth.
57
 As 
described in Part II supra, these instruments typically ask youth about 
a variety of illegal activities including current and past drug use, 
history of violent or assaultive behaviors, sexual deviancy and sexual 
offenses, victimization, abuse, and weapons possession. Moreover, 
clinical evaluators inquire about the same types of behavior when 
interviewing youth.  
Estelle v. Smith is the key Supreme Court case analyzing the 
interplay between forensic evaluations and the privilege against self-
incrimination.
58
 In Estelle, the Court held that statements made to a 
psychiatrist during a court-ordered examination were inadmissible 
during both the guilt and penalty phases of a criminal trial.
59
 The 
defendant in Estelle was indicted for murder, and prior to his trial, the 
judge ordered a psychiatric examination to determine if he was 
competent to stand trial.
60
 He was deemed competent and was later 
convicted of murder and subsequently sentenced to death.
61
 During 
the sentencing hearing, the examining psychiatrist testified to 
disclosures that the defendant made to him, as well as to his own 
personal conclusions as to the defendant‘s future dangerousness.62 
The Supreme Court found that because the psychiatric 
examination was ordered by the court to determine the defendant‘s 
competence, the psychiatrist was acting as an agent of the state.
63
 
 
 57. THOMAS GRISSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 152 (Prof‘l Res. Press 1998). 
 58. 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 59. Id. at 462–63. 
 60. Id. at 456–57.  
 61. Id. at 457–60. 
 62. Id. at 458–60.  
 63. Id. at 467. 
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Prior to submitting to the psychiatric exam, the defendant was not 
read Miranda warnings, nor did he make a valid waiver of his 
rights.
64
 The Court held that the compelled examination of the 
defendant while in state custody violated his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.
65
 Furthermore, the defendant‘s 
right to counsel attached prior to the court-ordered evaluation.
66
 
Consequently, the Court further held that the defendant‘s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney was 
not advised as to the full scope of the possible uses of the defendant‘s 
statements prior to the psychiatric examination.
67
 The Estelle holding 
confirms the right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination at both the guilt and penalty phases. Key to the Estelle 
holding was the finding that the defendant was ordered to undergo 
the evaluation.  
But what protections apply when a minor requests a pre-trial 
forensic evaluation in support of a motion, for example, to seek 
adjudication in juvenile court? At least twelve states—Alabama, 
Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New 
Jersey, North Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming—have 
enacted statutes or court rules securing youths‘ rights against self-
incrimination when undergoing examinations conducted to aid the 
court in determining whether a youth should be tried in juvenile or 
adult court.
68
 For example, the Michigan court rule specifically 
provides: 
 
 64. Id. at 466–67. 
 65. Id. at 473. 
 66. Id. at 470. 
 67. Id. at 469–71. 
 68. ALA. CODE § 15-19-5 (2010) (statements made by the defendant during examination 
to determine youthful offender status may not be used against defendant until sentencing, after 
defendant has been found guilty); see also ALA. R. EVID. 503(d)(2) (communications made in 
the course of court-ordered examinations are not privileged with respect to the particular 
purpose for which the examination is ordered); ALA. R. EVID. 503A(d)(2) (rule also applies to 
court-ordered examinations conducted by counselors); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-30.2(e) (2011) 
(prohibits using statements made by juvenile in transfer proceedings in later criminal 
proceedings over the juvenile‘s objection); IOWA CODE § 232.45(11)(b) (2010) (statements 
made during intake or waiver hearing are inadmissible in case-in-chief in subsequent criminal 
proceedings over child‘s objections); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 862(C)(2) (2009) (transfer 
hearing record is not admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings except for impeachment); 
see also In re Bruno, 388 So. 2d 784, 787 (La. 1980) (statements made in court-ordered 
examination for purposes of waiver hearing, inadmissible at trial on the issue of guilt or 
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(G) Psychiatric Testimony. 
 (1) A psychiatrist, psychologist, or certified social worker 
who conducts a court-ordered examination for the purpose of a 
waiver hearing may not testify at a subsequent criminal 
proceeding involving the juvenile without the juvenile‘s 
written consent. 
 (2) The juvenile‘s consent may only be given: 
  (a) in the presence of an attorney representing the juvenile 
or, if no attorney represents the juvenile, in the presence of 
a parent, guardian, or legal custodian;  
  (b) after the juvenile has had an opportunity to read the 
report of the psychiatrist, psychologist, or certified social 
worker; and  
  (c) after the waiver decision is rendered.  
 
innocence). MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-12(b)-(c) (West 2010) (statements in 
court-ordered evaluations are inadmissible at any adjudicatory hearing except on the issue of 
respondent‘s competence to participate in such proceedings and responsibility for his conduct, 
or in a criminal proceeding prior to conviction; statements made at waiver hearing cannot be 
used in adjudication or criminal trial unless a person is charged with perjury and the statement 
is relevant to that charge); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 3.950(G)(1) (2010) (―A psychiatrist, 
psychologist, or certified social worker who conducts a court-ordered examination for the 
purpose of a waiver hearing may not testify at a subsequent criminal proceeding involving the 
juvenile without the juvenile‘s written consent‖); see also People v. Hana, 504 N.W.2d 166 
(Mich. 1993) (codified in MICH. CT. R. 3.950(G)(1)); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(7) (West 
2010) (testimony at the hearing is not admissible ―in any proceeding other than the transfer 
hearing‖); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:4A-29 (West 2011) (―No testimony of a juvenile at a hearing 
[regarding transfer to adult court] shall be admissible . . . to determine delinquency or guilt‖); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(6) (2009) (statements made by the child at the transfer hearing 
are not admissible against the child over objection in the criminal proceedings following the 
transfer except for impeachment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134(f)(1) (2010) (statements made 
by the juvenile at a transfer hearing are not admissible against the child, over objection, in 
further criminal proceedings); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.2(A) (2005) (―Statements made by a 
juvenile at a transfer hearing . . . shall not be admissible against him over objection in any 
criminal proceedings following the transfer, except for purposes of impeachment‖); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237(e) (2010) (―Statements made by [a juvenile in] transfer hearing are not 
admissible against him over objection in a criminal proceeding following the transfer.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012] Outside the Police Station: Juvenile Self-Incrimination 195 
 
 
 (3) Consent to testimony by the psychiatrist, psychologist, 
or certified social worker does not waive the juvenile‘s 
privilege against self-incrimination.
69
 
 Courts in at least nine other states have issued rulings to protect 
youths‘ self-incrimination rights in the transfer/waiver context, even 
where statute or court rule does not explicitly do so.
70
 For example, 
the Nevada Supreme Court struck down the state‘s presumptive 
certification statute on Fifth Amendment grounds.
71
 The statute in 
question in the In re William M. appeal created a rebuttal assumption 
that youth fourteen years of age and older charged with certain 
offenses are to be tried in adult court.
72
 To rebut the presumption, the 
juvenile court had to find clear and convincing evidence that the 
juvenile‘s criminal actions were substantially influenced by substance 
abuse or emotional or behavioral problems that may be appropriately 
 
 69. MICH. CT. R. 3.950(G). 
 70. R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d 204, 211 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (court-ordered psychological 
evaluation for use in determining amenability to treatment as a minor violates a child‘s 
privilege against self-incrimination); In re Appeal In Pima County, Juvenile Action No. J-
77027-1, 679 P.2d 92, 95–96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (court‘s failure to order limits upon use 
which could be made of juvenile‘s statements made pursuant to a court-ordered mental 
evaluation for transfer determination and its penalizing of juvenile for refusing to cooperate in 
the mental evaluation violated juvenile‘s privilege against self-incrimination); Ramona R. v. 
Superior Court, 693 P.2d 789, 792 (Cal. 1985) (testimony of minor during fitness hearing, or 
statements made to probation officers, cannot be used at trial); In re A.D.G., 895 P.2d 1067, 
1072–73 (Colo. App. 1994) (cert. denied June 5, 1995) (juvenile cannot be ordered to undergo 
psychological examination over objection in transfer proceeding because it would infringe on 
his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); cf. Clemons v. State, 317 N.E.2d 
859, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975) (Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination is inapplicable in the juvenile court waiver hearing setting where a 
confession by the juvenile may not be viewed as inculpatory and where it may not be used in a 
later criminal or delinquency adjudication); In re S.J.T., 736 N.W.2d 341, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2007) (presumptive certification does not violate privilege against self-incrimination because 
courts can grant tranasactional immunity to provide protection against further use of testimony 
and compelled investigation); In re William M., 196 P.3d 456, 464–65 (Nev. 2008) (court held 
that statute requiring juveniles to admit to the charged criminal conduct in order to rebut 
certification to adult court was an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment); 
Christopher P. v. State, 816 P.2d 485 (N.M. 1991) (privilege against self-incrimination 
prohibits forcing juveniles to make inculpatory statements during court-ordered evaluations 
prepared for amenability determinations); Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 509–10 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2011) (court held that the trial court violated youth‘s right against self-incrimination 
when it required youth to admit to the charged offenses in order to demonstrate his amenability 
to treatment in the juvenile system).  
 71. In re William M., 196 P.3d 456, 509–10 (Nev. 2008). 
 72. Id. at 457–58.  
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treated within the juvenile justice system.
73
 In consolidated appeals, 
appellants were two juveniles charged, in separate cases, with 
offenses involving the use of a firearm. In support of their efforts to 
rebut the presumption in order to be tried in juvenile court, the youth 
submitted to the trial court behavioral health evaluations detailing 
substance abuse and mental health disorders.
74
 The evaluations, 
however, failed to draw any connection between these issues and the 
charged offenses as the youth asserted their innocence throughout the 
process.
75
 The juvenile court concluded that neither youth could meet 
their rebuttal burden of showing a nexus between substance abuse or 
behavioral problems and the alleged crimes because they had asserted 
that they were not present at the times the crimes were committed.
76
  
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the certification statute 
violated the Fifth Amendment because it essentially required an 
admission to the charged conduct in order to overcome the 
presumption but contained no provision explicitly prohibiting the use 
of that admission to establish guilt in a later proceeding.
77
 The court 
found the statute unconstitutional because it put the youth in the 
untenable position of having to choose either to remain in adult court 
despite having a substance abuse or emotional or behavioral problem, 
or to admit guilt at the pre-trial stage, even though the admission 
could later be used against him in a juvenile or criminal hearing.
78
  
The William M. court found that the Nevada certification provision 
was facially invalid.
79
  
A Pennsylvania appellate court recently upheld an as-applied 
challenge to the state‘s decertification statute. In Commonwealth v. 
Brown, a minor charged in adult criminal court with one count of 
homicide and one count of homicide of an unborn child, moved to 
transfer or ―decertify‖ his case to juvenile court.80 Pursuant to a 
 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 459–60. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 464. Moreover, even if the youth made an admission and rebutted the 
presumption, the juvenile court could still exercise its discretion to certify him to adult court. Id. 
at 463. 
 78. Id. at 457.  
 79. Id. at 464–65. 
 80. 26 A.3d 485, 489 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).  
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Pennsylvania statute, the minor bears the burden of showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that transfer would serve the public 
interest. Among the six factors that the court must consider is 
whether the youth is amenable to treatment, rehabilitation or 
supervision in the juvenile system.
81
 In support of his decertification 
motion, the minor was evaluated by a psychologist and psychiatrist at 
the request of the Commonwealth.
82
 The minor maintained his 
innocence during both evaluations.
83
 At the decertification hearing, 
the minor‘s expert psychologist opined, based on his evaluation, that 
the minor was amenable to treatment in the juvenile court.
84
 By 
contrast, the Commonwealth expert‘s testified that because the minor 
asserted his innocence, he could not be rehabilitated because he did 
not take responsibility for his actions.
85
 The trial court denied the 
minor‘s decertification, finding that he was not amenable to 
rehabilitation; specifically, the court credited the Commonwealth 
expert‘s opinion that the ―first step towards rehabilitation cannot be 
taken unless [the minor] would come forward and take responsibility 
for his actions[.]‖86 The trial court found ―persuasive reasoning from 
[the commonwealth‘s expert]‖ that the minor would not take 
responsibility for his actions, and thus, that the ―prospects of 
rehabilitation within the juvenile court jurisdiction [was] likely to be 
unsuccessful.‖87 
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, holding that 
the trial court ―violated [the minor‘s] rights against self-incrimination 
 
 81. See id. at 492 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)). 
 82. Id. at 489–90. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 490. The commonwealth‘s expert specifically stated that the minor ―‗was very 
avoidant‘ in talking about ‗the evidence that was presented at the preliminary hearing‘ and also 
‗the factual allegations of the offense‘‖; and that the minor  
tends to avoid or reacts by avoiding taking responsibility, which, in my opinion, 
complicates the process of rehabilitation, because . . . in order to be rehabilitated as a 
result of a conviction for a serious crime, you have to take responsibility for your 
behavior . . . And [Appellant cannot] make the first step [towards rehabilitation] if [he] 
. . . doesn‘t take responsibility for [his] behavior. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 86. Id. (some alterations in original). 
 87. Id. (some alterations in original). 
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because it effectively required him to admit guilt or accept 
responsibility to prove that he was amenable to treatment and capable 
of rehabilitation.‖88 Such an application of the decertification was 
unconstitutional because the minor was not granted use and 
derivative use immunity for statements made during the 
decertification process, thus exposing him to future prosecution using 
his statements.
89
 Absent a grant of immunity co-extensive with the 
privilege, the trial court‘s application placed the minor in a classic 
―penalty‖ situation—he had to either choose to maintain his 
innocence and thus remain in adult criminal court where he faced a 
sentence of life without opportunity of parole, or forfeit his right 
against self-incrimination in an effort to be tried in juvenile court 
where he would receive treatment until the age of twenty-one.
90
 The 
appellate court concluded: 
The trial court‘s condition, therefore, coercively sought to grant 
Appellant the possibility of juvenile transfer in return for Appellant‘s 
incriminating statements. As part of the exchange, the 
Commonwealth could strengthen its case against Appellant, while 
Appellant would not be guaranteed transfer to the juvenile system. 
Given the facts of this case, the profound benefits of juvenile transfer 
are reasonably sufficient to compel Appellant to waive his Fifth 
Amendment rights and testify against himself. That is, the gross 
disparity between the potential sentence in the criminal and juvenile 
divisions operate to exert such pressure on Appellant to ―foreclose a 
free choice to remain silent[ ] and therefore . . . compel the 
incriminating testimony.‖91  
State statutes provide criteria for trial courts to consider in 
determining whether youth of a certain age who are alleged to have 
committed crimes are to be tried as juveniles or as adults. The criteria 
invariably includes a finding as to the child‘s amenability or 
 
 88. Id. at 493. 
 89. Id. at 499. The court noted that ―‗immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive 
with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is [also] sufficient to 
compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.‘‖ Id. at 500 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Webster, 470 A.2d 532, 535 (1983)). 
 90. See id. at 503–04.  
 91. Id. (quoting in part Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 661 (1976)). 
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likelihood of rehabilitation and treatment in the juvenile system.
92
 
But as described above, not all states have statutory prohibitions on 
the admission of inculpatory statements made during evaluations and 
hearings used to determine amenability to treatment.  
The Estelle, William M. and Brown opinions offer important 
strategies for attorneys defending youths‘ right against self-
incrimination in transfer/waiver proceedings. Under Estelle, 
defendants in delinquency or criminal trials can move to suppress 
statements made during compelled evaluations on the grounds that 
the statements were coerced, they were elicited in violation of the 
prescripts of Miranda and/or that their introduction would violate the 
defendant‘s right to counsel. The William M. and Brown cases 
protect youth when they continue to assert innocence during the 
transfer/waiver stage and allow the attorney to argue that the court 
cannot hold this against the youth when assessing his/her chances of 
rehabilitation in the juvenile system. 
On a policy level, defense attorneys can advocate for the 
enactment of explicit provisions prohibiting the use of statements 
made in transfer/waiver evaluations in future proceedings. The key 
question is how much immunity must these provisions provide? The 
Brown court noted that ―immunity from use and derivative use is 
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, 
 
 92. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. § 12-15-203(d)(5) (LEXIS 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
27-318(g) (LEXIS 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-518(4)(b)(IV)-(V) (LEXIS 2011); 10 DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1010(a)(2), (c)(1) (LEXIS 2011); D.C. CODE § 16-2307(d)(2)(a), (e) 
(LEXIS 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.556(4)(c)(6), (8) (LEXIS 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 571-22(c)(5), (7) (LEXIS 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-508(8)(d), (f) (LEXIS 2011); 705 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805(3)(b)(i)-(v), 405/5-805(2)(b)(i)-(v) (LEXIS 2011); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 640.010(2)(b)(3), (7) (LEXIS 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347(e)(6)-(7) 
(LEXIS 2011); 15 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 3101(4)(D)(2) (LEXIS 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 43-21-157(5) (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071(6) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-276 
(LEXIS 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:24(I)(f), (h) (LEXIS 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 32A-2-20(B)(1), (C)(5) (LEXIS 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2200(b), 2203(b)(2) (LEXIS 
2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(3) (LEXIS 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.12(E) 
(LEXIS 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A § 2-5-205(E)(4) (LEXIS 2011); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 419C.349(4)(a) (LEXIS 2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(A)(4)(iii)(G) (LEXIS 2011); TEX. 
FAM. CODE § 54.02(f)(2), (4) (LEXIS 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-703(3)(e) (LEXIS 
2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-10(f)-(g) (LEXIS 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18(5)(a) 
(LEXIS 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237(b)(v)-(vii) (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, 
§ 5204(d)(1) (LEXIS 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-26969.1(A)(3) (LEXIS 2011); see also 
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2006).  
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and therefore is [also] sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of 
the privilege.‖93 Arguably, only statutory provisions that provide both 
use and derivative use immunity for statements made in court-
ordered evaluations are constitutionally sufficient to overcome the 
privilege. However, most statutes and court rules identified in this 
Article only provide use immunity.  
IV. EVALUATIONS IN THE COMPETENCY CONTEXT 
As with evaluations conducted to aid the judge in determining 
whether a youth should be tried in juvenile or adult court, 
competency examinations take place prior to an adjudication or 
conviction. Competency is not unique to juvenile court as it has been 
raised in adult criminal court since the Supreme Court‘s 1960 ruling 
in Dusky v. United States.
94
 But, it is still a relatively new 
phenomenon for competency issues to be litigated in juvenile court. 
As the Vermont legislature noted in enacting a juvenile competency 
court rule in 2006:  
Though there have been relatively few instances of the need 
for such determinations in Vermont, there is increasing 
concern in the state, and in a developing body of national 
literature, that juvenile and other courts be aware of the 
specific competency issues that may arise depending on the 
juvenile‘s maturity as well as mental ability. . . . In the absence 
of a rule, there is also a lack of uniformity among the Family 
Court judges in the procedure for competency 
determinations.
95
 
 
 93. Brown, 26 A.3d at 500 (citing Commonwealth v. Webster, 470 A.2d 532, 535 (1983)).  
 94. 362 U.S. 402, 402–03 (1960).  
 95. VT. R. FAM. P. 1 reporter‘s Notes (2006 Amendment) (adding VT. V.R. FAM. F.P. 
1(i)). The legislature cited to the then emerging literature on juvenile competence, including 
Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y 
& L. 3–32 (1997)); Marty Beyer, What’s Behind Behavior Matters: The Effects of Disabilities, 
Trauma, and Immaturity on Juvenile Intent and Ability to Assist Counsel, 58 GUILD PRAC. 2 
(2001); RICHARD E. REDDING, INST. OF LAW, PSYCHIATRY & PUB. POLICY, ADJUDICATIVE 
COMPETENCE IN JUVENILES: LEGAL AND CLINICAL ISSUES, JUVENILE FORENSIC FACT SHEET 
(2000); see also Note, Statutory Reform in the Georgia Juvenile Court System: Juvenile 
Competency Issues Finally Addressed, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 879, 879 (1999) (noting that as of 
1999, only a handful of states had a codified structure for juvenile competency hearings). 
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Similarly, Louisiana enacted 2004 amendments to its juvenile 
competency statute in recognition of ―the need to refine the unique 
process by which a child is determined to be capable of standing trial 
in the juvenile court‖ as contrasted to an adult in criminal court.96 
Citing to the MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Study, 
the commentary to the 2004 amendments emphasized the importance 
of employing evaluators with expertise in child development in 
assessing capacity, as ―[d]eficiencies in risk perception, as well as 
immature attitudes toward authority figures, may undermine 
competent decision making in ways that standard assessments of 
competence to stand trial do not capture.‖97  
A survey identified juvenile competency statutes and/or rules 
currently in effect in twenty-one jurisdictions—Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, Vermont and 
Virginia.
98
 These juvenile competency statutes and court rules 
typically set forth a variation of the standard for adult competence 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States: a 
defendant must have ―sufficient present ability to consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding‖ and ―a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him.‖99 Some provisions also provide the courts with criteria to 
consider in determining whether a youth satisfies the two-prong 
Dusky test to ensure that ―evaluations of a particular juvenile‘s 
 
 96. LA. CHILD CODE. ANN. art. 832 Comments 2004 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. (citing Grisso et al., Juveniles’ and Adults’ Competence as Trial Defendants, 27 L. 
& HUM. BEHAV. 33 (2002)). 
 98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-291.02 (2007); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-502 (LEXIS 
2011) (applicable to juveniles under thirteen years of age charged with capital murder or 
murder in the first degree); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 709; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-1301 
(2011); Conn. R. P. 31a-14; D.C. CODE § 16-2315(b-1) (2011); FLA. STAT. § 985.19 (2007); 
Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.095; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-150, -153 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-
519A; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2348(a); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art 832-835 (2011); MD. CODE 
ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-17.4 (LEXIS 2011); MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 20.01 Subd.; MO. S. 
CT. R. 117.01; NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-258 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:20 (2011); 
N.M. CHILD. CT. R. 10-242; OHIO JUV. R. 32(A); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.31 (2011); VT. R. 
FAM. P. 1(i); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-356 (2011).  
 99. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).  
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competency are . . . made with regard to juvenile norms.‖100 For 
example, in Vermont, an examiner is to consider, inter alia, the 
youth‘s developmental maturity with respect to thought, sense of 
identity and moral reasoning, any history of developmental delays or 
disabilities, as well as the impact of any past or present trauma on the 
youth‘s capacity.101 Arkansas‘ statute similarly provides a detailed 
list of issues that the examiner must consider with respect to 
capabilities and developmental level, including whether the juvenile 
has logical decision-making abilities, an ability to realistically 
appraise likely outcomes, and reason through available options and 
weigh their consequences.
102
 
As in the transfer/waiver context, and as was demonstrated in 
Estelle v. Smith, supra, competency evaluations can elicit 
incriminating information from the youth. Arkansas‘ juvenile 
competency statute, for example, directs the examiner to provide an 
opinion as to whether, developmentally, the youth has, inter alia, an 
ability ―to disclose to an attorney a reasonably coherent description of 
facts pertaining to the charges‖ and ―to articulate his or her 
motives.‖103 Similarly, in Florida, the evaluator must opine as to 
whether the child has the capacity to disclose facts pertinent to the 
charges to his or her counsel.
104
 Even without making these specific 
inquiries, the competence evaluator is likely to elicit statements or 
information about the circumstances surrounding the alleged 
offenses. 
In fact, a number of the juvenile competency statutes/court rules 
cited above contemplate such an outcome as these provisions 
incorporate explicit protections against self-incrimination. 
Specifically, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District of 
Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, Vermont and 
Virginia include provisions restricting the use of any statements made 
in the course of a competency evaluation in future proceedings.
105
 By 
 
 100. In re J.M., 769 A.2d 656, 662 (Vt. 2001). 
 101. VT. R. Fam. P.1(i) reporter‘s notes (2006 Amendment). 
 102. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-502(b)(7)(C)(ix)(b). 
 103. Id. § 9-27-502(b)(7)(C)(ix)(b)(2)(E)-(F).  
 104. FLA. STAT. § 985.19(f)(4).  
 105. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-291.06(B) (stating that any statement made during a 
competence examination, or any evidence resulting from such statement, is not admissible in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/6
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way of example, Arizona law provides both use and derivative use 
immunity for statements made during a competency examination: 
(A) The privilege against self-incrimination applies to any 
examination or to any statement that is made to restoration 
personnel during the course and scope of a court ordered 
restoration program. 
(B) Any evidence or statement that is obtained during an 
examination or any evidence or statement that is made to 
 
any proceeding to determine the juvenile‘s guilt or innocence unless the juvenile presents 
evidence to rebut presumption of sanity); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-502 (citing ARK. CODE. 
ANN. § 5-2-301; ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-2-307) (statements made during examination are only 
admissible if admissible under rules of evidence and constitutionally admissible); see also ARK. 
R. EVID. 503(b), (d) (statements in court ordered evaluations admissible only for purpose 
ordered); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-1305(3) (2011) (―Evidence obtained during a competency 
evaluation or during treatment related to the juvenile‘s competency or incompetency and the 
determination as to the juvenile‘s competency or incompetency is not admissible on the issues 
raised by a plea of not guilty.‖); CONN. R. P. 31a-14 (information obtained during mental health 
screening or assessment shall be used solely for planning and treatment purposes; information 
is confidential and may only be disclosed for any court ordered evaluation of treatment; such 
information not subject to subpoena or court process); D.C. CODE § 16-2315(e)(4), (6) (results 
of mental or physical examination not admissible as evidence at the juvenile fact-finding 
hearing or in any criminal proceeding); FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.095(d)(5) (information learned in 
court ordered competency evaluations only for the limited purpose of competency to proceed); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2348(a)(2) (no statement made, whether examination with or without 
the minor‘s consent, shall be admitted in evidence against the juvenile in any hearing); MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.§ 3-8A-17.10(b)(1) (any statement made or information elicited 
may be admitted in evidence in any proceeding except the competency proceeding); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 552.020 (14) (no statement made by the accused in the course of any examination or 
treatment pursuant to this section and no information received by any examiner or other person 
in the course thereof, whether such examination or treatment was made with or without the 
consent of the accused or upon his motion or upon that of others, shall be admitted in evidence 
against the accused on the issue of guilt); OHIO JUV. R. 32(B) (―[A]ny social history, physical 
examination or mental examination ordered pursuant to subdivision (A) Shall be utilized only 
for the limited purposes therein specified. The person preparing a social history or making a 
physical or mental examination shall not testify about the history or examination or information 
received in its preparation in any juvenile traffic offender, delinquency, or unruly child 
adjudicatory hearing, except as may be required. . . .‖); VT. R. FAM. P. 1(i)(4) (―No statement 
made in the course of an examination by the child examined, whether or not the child has 
consented to, or obtained, the examination, shall be admitted as evidence in the delinquency 
proceedings for the purpose of proving the delinquency alleged or for the purpose of 
impeaching the testimony of the child examined.‖); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-360 (1999) (―No 
statement or disclosure by the juvenile concerning the alleged offense made during a 
competency evaluation ordered pursuant to § 16.1-356, or services ordered pursuant to § 16.1-
357, may be used against the juvenile at the adjudication or disposition hearings as evidence or 
as a basis for such evidence.‖). 
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restoration personnel during the course and scope of a 
restoration program is not admissible in any proceeding to 
determine the juvenile‘s guilt or innocence unless the juvenile 
presents evidence that is intended to rebut the presumption of 
sanity. 
(C) Any statement that a juvenile makes during any 
examination, any statement that a juvenile makes to restoration 
personnel during the course and scope of a restoration program 
or any evidence resulting from the statement concerning any 
other event or transaction is not admissible in any proceeding 
to determine the juvenile‘s guilt or innocence of any other 
charges that are based on those events or transactions.
106
 
By contrast, no explicit provisions were found in California,
107
 
Georgia, Idaho,
108
 Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico and Texas that restrict the admissibility of statements 
made during competency evaluations, despite the fact that these states 
have juvenile competency statutes/court rules.  
As described in Part II supra, attorneys can defend a youth‘s right 
against self-incrimination in competency proceedings. First, the 
attorney can request that the court include language in the order for a 
competency evaluation that provides for immunity for any self-
incriminating statements during the evaluation. Defendants in 
delinquency or criminal trials can always move to suppress 
statements made during compelled evaluations on the grounds that 
the statements were coerced, they were elicited in violation of the 
prescripts of Miranda and/or their introduction would violate the 
defendant‘s right to counsel. Outside the context of individual cases, 
the bar can urge that immunity provisions be incorporated into 
juvenile competence statutes and court rules as these are enacted. 
 
 106. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-291.06 (2007).  
 107. But see Baqleh v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 4th 478, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002) (holding statements in court ordered evaluations to determine competency 
inadmissible at guilt and sentencing stages). 
 108.  ―No statements of the juvenile relating to the alleged offense shall be included in the 
report unless such statements are relevant to the examiner or evaluation committee‘s opinion 
regarding competency.‖ IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-519A(6)(f) (2011). However, on its face, this 
statute does not prohibit the admission in future proceedings of relevant statements that are 
included in the examiner‘s report. 
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V. COURT ORDERED TREATMENT 
Another situation in which youth may be compelled to divulge 
information about offending behavior is during treatment that they 
undergo pursuant to a court‘s disposition order. Rehabilitation and 
treatment are two fundamental missions of the juvenile court. 
Juvenile courts can and often do order youth to complete various 
types of mental health, substance abuse and other treatment programs 
as part of their post-adjudication dispositions. Some state juvenile 
correctional systems offer a wide array of behavioral health services 
to youth, such as individual, group and family psychotherapy, 
substance abuse treatment and sex offender treatment. For example, 
Ohio, Texas and Florida offer intensive mental health services within 
designated correctional facilities.
109
 When publicly-run correctional 
settings do not offer appropriate treatment, courts can send youth to 
specialized, privately-run residential treatment facilities as part of 
their dispositions. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention reports that in 2009, 32 percent of all juvenile offenders in 
out-of-home placements were held in residential treatment facilities 
that ―frequently offer a combination of substance abuse and mental 
health treatment programs, such as psychoanalytic therapy, 
psychoeducational counseling, special education, behavioral 
management, group counseling, family therapy, and medication 
management, along with 24-hour supervision in a highly structured 
(often staff-secure) environment.‖110 
Services to treat behavioral health disorders such as individual and 
group psychotherapy specifically elicit self-incriminating information 
from youth. In fact, professionals treating youth in the juvenile justice 
system may focus on trying to get the youth to admit to 
misbehavior—including conduct that was not the basis of the 
 
 109. Kathleen R. Skowyra & Joseph J. Cocozza, National Center for Mental Health and 
Juvenile Justice, Blueprint for Change: A Comprehensive Model for the Identification and 
Treatment of Youth with Mental Health Needs in Contact with the Juvenile Justice System 58 
(2007) (citing Lee Underwood, W. Mullan & C. Walte, We Built Them and They Came: New 
Insights for Managing Ohio’s Aggressive Juvenile Offenders with Mental Illness, 1 
CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY 19–27 (Fall 1997). 
 110. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, 
Model Programs Guide, Residential Treatment Centers, OJJDP http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/ 
progTypesResidentialTreatment.aspx (last visited Dec. 29, 2011). 
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delinquency adjudication that led to their placement in the program—
as they believe that such admissions are an important part of the 
rehabilitative process. This is certainly a risk in many sex offender 
programs, which emphasize such disclosures, indeed even mandate 
them, as part of the therapeutic process.
111
 
A survey yielded five jurisdictions—the District of Columbia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—with either statutes or 
court rules explicitly prohibiting the use of statements made in court-
ordered treatment to determine guilt in juvenile delinquency and 
criminal proceedings.
112
 The Illinois rule also excludes statements 
 
 111. Jill Levenson & David D‘Amora, An Ethical Paradigm for Sex Offender Treatment: 
Response to Glaser, 6 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 145, 149 (2005); Bill Glaser, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence: An Ethical Paradigm for Therapists in Sex Offender Treatment Programs, 4 W. 
CRIMINOLOGY REV. 143, 146 (2003); Jessica Wilen Berg, Note, Give Me Liberty or Give Me 
Silence: Taking a Stand on Fifth Amendment Implications for Court Ordered Therapy 
Programs, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 700, 702 (1994); see also Welch v. Kentucky, 149 S.W.3d 
407, 409 (Ky. 2004) (noting that court-ordered participants in sex offender treatment programs 
are strongly encouraged by counselors to disclose all prior sexual misconduct because such 
disclosure is necessary to obtain and keep certain privileges during treatment and to 
demonstrate successful program completion to the court). 
 112. D.C. CODE § 24-531.10 (2005) (―Any statement that is obtained during a court-
ordered examination, evaluation, or treatment, or any evidence resulting from that statement, is 
not admissible at any proceeding to determine a defendant‘s guilt or innocence or to determine 
an appropriate sentence, except when the defendant puts his competence or mental health at 
issue in the proceeding.‖); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.5(h) (―A statement, admission, 
confession, or incriminating information made by or obtained from a minor . . . as part of any 
behavioral health screening, assessment, evaluation, or treatment, whether or not court-ordered, 
shall not be admissible as evidence against the minor on the issue of guilt only in the instant 
juvenile court proceeding.‖); IND. CODE ANN. (2007) §§ 31-32-2-2.5, 31-37-8-4.5 (statements 
by juveniles in court-ordered treatment are inadmissible as to guilt, except as to homicide); see 
also Sims v. State, 601 N.E.2d 344, 345–46 (Ind. 1992) (statements during court-ordered 
treatment protected by right against self-incrimination). But see Watson v. State, 784 N.E.2d 
515, 520 (Ind. 2003) (right against self-incrimination in court-ordered treatment waived when 
defendant put mental state at issue); WIS. STAT. § 971.18 (2011) (―A statement made by a 
person subjected to psychiatric examination or treatment . . . shall not be admissible in evidence 
against the person in any criminal proceeding on any issue other than that of the person‘s 
mental condition.‖); see also State v. Todd. F.M., 506 N.W.2d 427 (Wis. 1993) (upholding 
suppression of statement made by juvenile in treatment while in custody of residential treatment 
facility pursuant to delinquency adjudication). But see Moore v. State, 265 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 
1978) (statute does not preclude consideration of a psychiatric report at the sentencing stage); 
WY. JUV. PROC. R. 9 (stating that juvenile‘s admissions or incriminating statements made to a 
professional in the course of court-ordered treatment shall not, without the juvenile‘s consent, 
be admitted into evidence in any criminal or juvenile delinquency case brought against the 
juvenile, except that the privilege shall not apply to statements regarding future misconduct). 
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made when the youth voluntarily participates in treatment as part of 
his court case.
113
  
Absent explicit prohibitions to admissibility in statutes or rules, 
some courts—including those in Kentucky, Ohio, and Oregon—have 
applied traditional Fifth Amendment jurisprudence to suppress 
statements made by individuals in court-ordered treatment programs 
in subsequent delinquency hearings or criminal trials.
114
 For example, 
in Welch v. Commonwealth, the Virginia supreme court held that a 
juvenile‘s incriminating statements to counselors at a sex offender 
treatment program were inadmissible because they were elicited from 
the juvenile absent Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of his 
rights, and were involuntary.
115
 Upon conviction for a sex offense, 
the juvenile was committed to a facility where he was ordered to 
undergo sex offender treatment.
116
 A critical component of the 
involuntary treatment was to participate in group therapy and disclose 
all prior sexual misconduct; failure to do so meant that the juvenile 
could not successfully complete the court ordered program and return 
home.
117
 The juvenile subsequently disclosed to counselors prior 
uncharged sexual offenses without prior notice or warning from 
counselors that his disclosures could be used to prosecute him.
118
 The 
facility then notified law enforcement officers, who came to the 
facility, administered Miranda warnings and further questioned the 
juvenile, who again disclosed that he had committed sexual offenses 
against a child.
119
 New charges were brought against the juvenile 
based on these admissions.
120
 
The Welch court first held that the juvenile was subjected to 
custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda.
121
 The juvenile was 
 
 113. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.5(h) (2011). 
 114. Welch v. Com. of Kentucky, 149 S.W.3d 407, 412 (Ky. 2004); State v. Evans, 760 
N.E.2d 909, 914 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); State v. Gaither, 100 P.3d 768, 772 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that statements made by defendant to probation officer were involuntary where a 
failure to disclose list of victims to officer or face probation revocation). 
 115. 149 S.W.3d 407, 410–12 (2004). 
 116. Id. at 408. 
 117. Id. at 409. 
 118. Id. at 408–09. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 409. 
 121. Id. at 411. 
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in state custody, his participation in the treatment program 
involuntary, and he was intensely questioned by counselors as to his 
sexual misconduct as it was a prerequisite for successful completion 
of the program. On this evidence, the court concluded that his 
subsequent statements were the result of coercion.
122
 Moreover, the 
court specifically found that although not law enforcement officers, 
the counselors engaged in state action because their ―interrogation 
was such as to likely result in disclosure of information which would 
lead to facts that would form the basis for prosecution.‖123 The court 
also found that the statements made in treatment were involuntary 
and further held that the juvenile‘s subsequent statements to law 
enforcement were fruit of a poisonous tree and likewise must be 
suppressed.
124
  
An Ohio appellate court similarly found that statements made by a 
juvenile in the course of court-ordered therapy in a juvenile court-
operated facility were the product of coercion.
125
 The Ohio court also 
found that the juvenile was in custody, the treatment was involuntary, 
he was interrogated by the facility staff, and that he would be in 
violation of a court order and risked transfer to a more restrictive 
facility if he failed to answer their questions.
126
 It concluded however, 
that Miranda warnings were not required because there was no 
evidence that the staff had a duty to report to law enforcement.
127
 
Nevertheless, the court held that the juvenile‘s statements to facility 
staff were properly suppressed by the trial court because ―[b]y 
procuring two incriminating statements as a condition of court-
ordered therapy and under threat of substantial penalty, [the facility] 
placed [the juvenile] in the ‗classic penalty‘ situation.‖128 The court 
first found that the facility counselors exercised state power when 
they questioned the juvenile, stating that this analysis under the 
voluntariness test is distinct and broader than the inquiry of whether 
 
 122. Id. at 410.  
 123. Id. at 411. 
 124. Id. at 411–12.  
 125. State v. Evans, 760 N.E.2d 909, 914–15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 126. Id. at 919, 924. 
 127. Id. at 920–22 (distinguishing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)).  
 128. Id. at 922. 
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they were law enforcement agents for Miranda purposes.
129
 The court 
went on to note that the facility counselors engaged in  
[interrogation of] grinding duration and inevitability. [The 
juvenile] was warned when he arrived at [the facility] that he 
must divulge incriminating information. It was not a question 
of whether [the facility] would get the information; it was only 
a question of when [the juvenile] would succumb, as had all 
those who had preceded him. [Facility] counselors 
institutionally and effectively employed both inducements and 
threats to insure that [the juvenile] would eventually give them 
what they wanted and thereby incriminate himself.
130
 
Another group of state courts—including those in Hawaii, Idaho, 
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Washington—
found a violation when the defendant‘s probation was revoked or he 
was penalized in some other way for failing to ―cooperate‖ with 
treatment.
131
 Illustrative of these ―classic penalty‖ situations is the 
 
 129. Id. at 927. 
 130. Id. at 928. The court, however, held that a subsequent statement made to a counselor 
in response to the general question of ―how he got into so much trouble?‖ was voluntary. Id. It 
is unclear why the court did not apply a fruit of the poisonous tree analysis to this later 
statement. 
 131. State v. Reyes, 2 P.3d 725, 733 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000) (vacating and remanding 
probation revocation because defendant had not ―inexcusably failed to comply‖ with condition 
of court order when he continued to deny charged sex crimes); cf. State v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1318 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (upholding probation revocation because defendant had immunity from 
further prosecution as per plea agreement); State v. Kaquatosh, 600 N.W.2d 153, 158 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1999) (finding that it was a violation of a probationer‘s Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination to revoke his probation for failing to complete a court-ordered sex-offender 
treatment program where the failure was due to his refusal to admit facts underlying a 
conviction from which he was appealing); State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991) (―[W]e 
believe that the better reasoned decisions are those decisions which protect the defendant‘s 
constitutional right against self-incrimination, and which prohibit augmenting a defendant‘s 
sentence because he refuses to confess to a crime or invokes his privilege against self-
incrimination.‖); Bender v. New Jersey Dep‘t of Corr., 812 A.2d 1154, 1162 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2003) (finding that denial of good time and work credits for inmate‘s refusal to 
answer incriminatory questions about criminal history violated right against compelled self-
incrimination); Linberry, 572 S.E.2d 229, 236 (N.C. App. 2002) (holding that penalizing a 
youth who refuses to admit guilt in court-ordered sex offender treatment violated right against 
self-incrimination); State v. Warner, 889 P.2d 479, 484 (Wash. 1995) (suggesting that 
statements made during court-ordered treatment pursuant to delinquency adjudication are 
inadmissible in a criminal trial where compelled by threat of penalty); cf. Beaver v. State, 933 
P.2d 1178, 1186 (Ala. Ct. App. 1997) (holding admission of statements made by defendant 
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Hawaii case State v. Reyes, in which the court ordered a convicted 
defendant to participate in a sex-offender treatment program which 
required participants to admit their acts.
132
 The Reyes defendant 
refused to disclose any past acts and was deemed to have failed to 
complete the program, which consequently led the trial court to 
revoke his probation.
133
 On appeal, the court held that the 
requirement of admission violated the defendant‘s privilege against 
self-incrimination, and his refusal to admit guilt was not a valid 
reason to revoke his probation.
134
  
Finally, a few courts have suggested that information divulged in 
court-ordered treatment is protected by a physician-patient or 
psychotherapist privilege and therefore inadmissible on issues of 
guilt.
135
  
As described supra, when the government seeks to introduce 
statements made in court-ordered treatment as evidence on the issue 
of guilt in subsequent prosecutions, defense attorneys can argue for 
suppression on the grounds that the statements were not voluntary 
and/or were elicited absent a valid waiver of Miranda rights. But 
clearly an explicit prohibition in statute or court rule is a safer and 
 
during sex offender treatment at sentencing did not violate right against self-incrimination 
where defendants participation in treatment was completely voluntary). 
 132. Reyes, 2 P.3d at 727–28. 
 133. Id. at 730–31.  
 134. Id. at 733. 
 135. See, e.g., Sims v. State, 601 N.E.2d 344, 346 (Ind. 1992) (―[Statements during court-
ordered treatment] should be protected. As is the case with the physician-patient relationship, 
the purpose of protecting such communications is to insure that persons communicate fully and 
completely with their counselors in order to promote successful treatment.‖); cf. Watson v. 
State, 784 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ind. 2003) (physician-patient privilege in court-ordered treatment 
waived when defendant put mental state at issue); In re Ashley M., 683 N.Y.S.2d 304 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 3d 1998) (finding that required admissions during court-ordered treatment do not 
violate right against self-incrimination because statutory psychologist-patient privilege 
precludes use of statements in criminal prosecutions); Commonwealth v. Carter, 821 A.2d 601 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (finding that records of court-ordered treatment in delinquency 
adjudication are protected by psychologist-patient privilege if made for treatment purposes and 
are inadmissible unless defendant informed/waived Miranda rights). But see Commonwealth v. 
Smith, Pa. D. & C.4th 311 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (holding that Miranda warnings were not 
required but statements may be inadmissible if not voluntary under totality of circumstances); 
In re Todd. F.M., 506 N.W.2d 427, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (unpublished decision) 
(upholding suppression of statement made by juvenile in treatment while in custody of 
residential treatment facility pursuant to delinquency adjudication; statements were protected by 
statutory privilege applicable to communications made by those being treated under the 
direction of a physician or psychologist). 
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more reliable route for securing the youth‘s right against self-
incrimination. Because one of the major goals of the juvenile court is 
to treat and rehabilitate youth so that they may re-enter society, there 
is a strong societal interest in providing these protections. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the major challenges that a youth‘s defense attorney faces 
is to maximize the benefits that a youth can reap in the processes 
described in this Article—e.g., treatment for a substance abuse 
problem and trial in juvenile instead of adult court—while 
minimizing a youth‘s potential exposure to self-incrimination. The 
most risk averse approach is for counsel to advise his or her client not 
to participate in these processes and thus avoid potential self-
incrimination altogether. However, the cost to the youth of foregoing, 
for example, trial in juvenile court, will usually greatly outweigh the 
benefit of preventing exposure to self-incrimination. This Article first 
gives defense attorneys strategies to employ once the ―cat is out of 
the bag‖ and a statement has already been made. But in the longer 
run, it is advisable for the bar to take a more global approach and 
advocate for the passage of statutes and court rules that provide youth 
defendants with the necessary immunities so that these situations do 
not occur in the first place. 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
